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The Board of Directors and Firm Performance:  
Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies 
 
Purpose: This study seeks to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board 
structure/firm performance relationship, and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency 
theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: This research applies a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) methodology on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies 
for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, 
ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO-Chairman leadership. 
 
Findings: While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact upon performance, 
independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on 
firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder 
agreements do not affect firm performance.  
 
Research Implications: This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some 
of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure-performance relationship. Firm performance 
is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. 
Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring 
provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.  
 
Practical Implications: We suggest that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules 
and effectiveness of minority directors by controlling whether they are able to impede the main 
shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not 
impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO-duality, as the influence of CEO-duality on 
performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company. 
 
Originality/Value: The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in 
listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of 
research evidence of agency theory studies. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Agency Theory, Listed Companies, 
Performance, Italy 
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Introduction 
The active role in company affairs that boards of directors play (Judge and Reinhardt, 1997; 
Coles, McWilliams, and Nilanjan, 2001) can provide a platform (Aluchna, 2010) and an essential 
mechanism for mitigating the agency problem that arises between shareholders and management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Monks and Minow, 2004). Given that boards are responsible for the 
direction and leadership of their enterprises, it seems reasonable to conclude that directors actively 
influence firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellestrand and Johnson, 1999; Stiles and Taylor, 2001), 
and that they are therefore responsible (on behalf of shareholders) for deciding upon the types of 
board structure that may enable them to maximize shareholders’ wealth (O’Connel and Cramer, 2009; 
Knauer et al. 2018).  
For many years, the major theoretical context of corporate governance research has been 
agency theory (Seal, 2006), and the method for evaluating the relationship between board features 
and firm performance has typically been Return On Assets. Furthermore, the majority of agency 
theory studies are based on quantitative methodologies, and analyse Anglo-American listed 
companies (Yermak, 1996; Dalton, Daily, Ellestrand, and Johnson, 1998; Raheja, 2005); emerging 
and developing markets (Ehikioya, 2009), and selected European countries, such as Spain, Germany, 
France (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Donadelli, Fasan and Magnanelli, 2014; Bottenberg, 
Tuschke, and Flickinger, 2017). Little attention is paid to the case of Italy, despite its place as a large 
European economy with a corporate governance model that presents some features in common with 
two archetypes in the existing literature: the Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models. However, 
the Italian model has some distinctive characteristics which differentiate it from the two main 
corporate governance models. These include: ownership concentration; the limited role of financial 
markets; and the prevalence of family-owned listed companies. Therefore, it is important to 
understand whether and how corporate governance mechanisms affect the performance of Italian 
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listed companies, as these mechanisms are the main drivers of corporate governance best practice in 
Europe (Melis and Zattoni, 2017). 
Additionally, prior research into the performance of Italian companies (Melis, 2000; D’Onza, 
Greco and Ferramosca, 2014; Allegrini and Greco, 2011; Zona, 2014) has identified some conflicting 
results regarding the impact on firm performance of a range of board characteristics, including the 
board structure, the role of independent directors, the CEO leadership and ownership concentration,. 
For instance, Di Pietra, Grambovas, Raonic and Riccaboni (2008) found no relationship between the 
board size and performance; whereas Romano and Guerrini (2014) found a positive relationship, 
especially in the water utility sector. Research into CEO duality (whether the CEO simultaneously 
serves as board chairman) also appears to generate ambiguous results in the Italian context. In 
particular, CEO duality has negative effects (Allegrini and Greco, 2011) or positive effects (Zona, 
2014) or no significant effects on performance (Fratini and Tettamanzi, 2015). As a consequence, it 
is still unclear if and how the assumptions of agency theory are verified in the Italian context. 
Therefore, this research seeks to reconcile some of the conflicting findings in prior studies of the 
board structure/firm performance relationship, and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of 
agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice. In particular, this study 
measures and quantifies the relationship between the board of directors’ structure and the 
performance of Italian firms listed on the STAR segment of the Italian Stock Exchange over the 
period 2003-2015. We take into account those aspects which are considered to be fundamental to 
agency theory (Jensen, 1993): board size, independent directors, CEO/CM duality (when the CEO 
acts simultaneously as Chairman) and ownership. This research resolves the contrasting results of 
previous studies by finding a non-linear relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance; a positive effect of board size on firm performance only for lower number of directors; 
and a lack of influence of directors appointed by minority shareholders on performance. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: theory and hypotheses development are explained in section 
2. Section 3 addresses the Italian context and the research design. The core findings from the 
empirical study are outlined in section 4. Section 5 discusses our conclusions. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
The impact of board size on firm performance 
The board of directors is considered to be one of the primary internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (Brennan, 2006; Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, and Lee 2015). A well-established board 
with an optimum number of directors should monitor management effectively (Bhimani, 2009), and 
drive value enhancement for shareholders (Brennan, 2006). The board size, therefore, is a key factor 
that influences firm performance (Kumar and Singh, 2013). The board of directors, acting on behalf 
of shareholders, plays a central role as an internal mechanism and is viewed as a major decision-
making body within companies. Different and opposing theoretical evidence is presented to support 
the efficacy of both large and small board dimensions on firm performance. A minor stream of 
research advocates that larger board size could improve the efficacy of the decision-making process 
due to information sharing (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009). A larger board can take advantage of greater 
potential variety, with directors being appointed from diverse professional fields, with different 
expertise, and different skills (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Against this, supporters of the mainstream of 
agency theory (Jensen, 1993; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Well, 1998; de Andres et al., 2005) suggest 
that a larger board is less effective in enhancing corporate performance, because new ideas and 
opinions are less likely to be expressed in a large pool of directors, and the monitoring process is 
likely to be less effective (Ahmed, Hossain and Adams, 2006; Dalton et al., 1999). Larger boards 
increase problems of communication and coordination (Jensen, 1993; Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan 
2004; Cheng, 2008) and higher agency costs (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Cheng, 2008). Furthermore, 
larger boards could face problems of greater levels of conflict (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994) 
and lower group cohesion (Evans and Dion, 1991). Poor coordination among directors leads to slow 
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decision making and delays in information transfer, as well as causing inefficiencies in firms with 
larger board size (Goodstein et al., 1994). In fact, several empirical studies confirm that when board 
size increases, firm performance decreases progressively (Mark and Kusnadi, 2005; O’Connell and 
Cramer, 2009). For instance, Conyon and Peck (1998) find a negative association between board size 
and return on equity for a sample of European companies. 
Table 1 outlines empirical research conducted at an international level. We, therefore, define 
Hypothesis 1 as:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the board size and firm performance 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
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The impact of independent directors on firm performance 
While it is clear that all directors whether executive (those who hold positions within the 
enterprise) and nonexecutive (those who are appointed from outside) should be treated equally in 
terms of their board responsibilities, a crucial role of the latter is to ensure that the interests of all 
shareholders are protected. A further distinction may be made between those who act as nonexecutive 
directors (NEDs) on behalf of specific investors and shareholder groups and this who might be 
defined as independent directors and have no affiliation with the firm except for their directorship 
(Clifford and Evans, 1997). The role of both NEDs and the independent directors is to monitor 
management decisions and activities by corporate boards and to ensure that the executive is held to 
account. (Fama, 1980) This implies that they are highly responsive to investors, because they have to 
ensure that management decisions are made in the best interests of shareholders. Independent 
directors are reliable instruments of their companies, in terms of monitoring the management while 
remaining independent of the firm and its CEO (Daily et al. 1996). This role has been seen as a vital 
element in corporate governance codes and guidance since the earliest publications, and the role and 
duties of independent members of a board are clearly defined in corporate governance codes from all 
parts of the world and for all sizes of enterprise1. 
Only a fraction of empirical agency theory research finds a negative relationship (Khumar and 
Singh, 2012) or no relationship (Bhagat and Blac, 2002) between the proportion of independent 
directors and firm performance. On the other hand, the majority of empirical (Brickley, Coles and 
Rory 1994; Anderson, Manci and Reeb, 2004) and theoretical (Beasley, 1996) agency theory focused 
research suggests that independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. A higher 
proportion of independent directors on boards should result in a more effective monitoring role and 
limit managerial opportunism. This should lead to increased shareholder benefits (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992) and an enhancement to the economic and financial performance of the firm (Waldo, 1985; 
                                                 
1 For example, Cadbury (UK), 1992; Comitato per la Corporate Governance (Italy), 2015; Hawkamah (UAE), 2011. 
7 
 
Vancil, 1987) measured by return on assets, profit margins and dividend yields (Brown and Caylor, 
2004). Consistent with this research, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that shareholder wealth is 
influenced by the proportion of outside directors; their study document a positive stock price reaction 
at the announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director. This means that the 
monitoring and controlling role on management provided by independent directors is fundamental in 
order to reduce the likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), and it is also likely to 
benefit shareholders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). For the purposes of this study regressions were only 
practicable on the composition of the management board. 
Table 2 shows prior international literature that explores the relationship between independent 
directors and corporate performance. 
Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
and firm performance. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
The impact of board size with the moderating effect of independent directors on firm performance 
The impact of board size on firm performance can be moderated by the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board (Dalton et al., 1998). Based on the mainstream of agency 
theory, greater board size means more problems for communication, coordination, and decision-
making (Eisenberg et al., 1998 and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann, 2006). Similarly, 
independent directors with an excessively high number of other positions can have a negative impact 
on firm performance, given their commitments in other companies (Ibrahim and Samad, 2006), their 
lack of time (Masulis and Mobbs, 2009) and information asymmetry (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
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1990). Previous research (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) proposes that large boards 
with a high number of independent directors do not generate positive firm performance because the 
board size in conjunction with a high proportion of independent directors worsens the free riding 
problem2 (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) among directors relating to the monitoring of management 
(Lasfer, 2002), resulting in the board taking decisions that negatively affect firm performance. 
Accordingly, independent directors can improve effective board monitoring (Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 2003), because they can be valuable in aligning shareholders and managers’ 
interests 6. By doing so, independent directors ensure that managers implement executive decisions 
that lead to performance enhancement (Musteen, Datta and Hermann, 2009). Some studies (Agrawal 
and Knoeber 1996; Guest, 2009) suggest that an excessive number of independent directors 
negatively affects board size and firm performance, and that smaller boards with a higher proportion 
of independent directors are more effective than larger boards with a lower proportion of 
independents (Del Guercio et al., 2003). Therefore, independent directors can have a moderating 
effect on the impact of the board size on firms’ performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Therefore, we 
propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of independent directors moderates the negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance. 
 
The impact of CEO/CM duality on firm performance 
CEO duality (where the CEO simultaneously serves as board chairman) has become a topic 
of great interest and a focus for analysis (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Brickley et al., 1994; Mallin, 
2010) within an international debate on the impact of the separation of ownership and control. Interest 
in duality has emerged primarily because it is assumed to have significant implications for 
                                                 
2 Free-riding occurs when directors do not properly monitor the management of the firm; this typically occurs when the board becomes 
too large (Yermack, 1996) 
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organizational performance and corporate governance (Baliga et al., 1996). Two main opposing 
schools highlight the benefits (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) and the costs (Millstein and Katsh, 1992) 
related to CEO/CM duality. Supporters of CEO/CM duality consider the benefits to outweigh the 
potential disadvantages. For example, the CEO and the Chair might have conflicts between them, 
leading to confusion among employees (Goodwin and Seow, 2000), and damage firm performance 
(Li and Li, 2009). Additionally, a dual leadership structure can provide cost savings by eliminating 
information transferring and processing costs (Yang and Zhao, 2013; Goodwin and Seow, 2000). 
CEO/CM duality might also facilitate a more timely and effective decision-making process (Peng, 
Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 2009), as the chairman does not have to mediate the points of view of the 
independent directors and the CEO. On the other hand, with respect to the CEO duality costs, the 
agency theory literature suggests that when one person is in charge of both tasks, managerial 
dominance is deeply fostered because «that individual is more aligned with management than with 
shareholders and is likely to act to protect his or her job and enhance personal well-being» (Mallette 
and Fowler, 1992, p. 1016). As a consequence, merging the role of chairman and CEO means that the 
capacity to monitor and oversee management is decreased as a result of their lack of independence 
(Lorsch and Maclever, 1989; Fizel and Louie, 1990). Additionally, given the fact that CEOs with 
specific expertise could negatively affect firm performance (Serra, Três and Ferreira, 2016), CEO 
non-duality may lead to a variety of skills and expertise between a CEO and a chairman. In a similar 
vein, Baliga et al. (1996) and Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that CEO duality seriously damages the 
independence of the board. Indeed, when only one person leads a company, the role of independent 
directors becomes ‘hypothetical’ (Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Daynton, 1984), i.e. in the case of the 
dual leadership structure  the board is likely to function as a “rubber stamp” given the total control of 
the CEO (Rechner, 1989).  
Many empirical and agency-related studies (Palmon and Wald, 2002; Pi and Timme, 1993; Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991) find a negative relationship between CEO/CM duality and firm performance. The 
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key findings of existing empirical studies are reported in Table 3. In line with the core findings from 
prior international literature, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 4: Firm performance exhibits a negative association under a leadership structure 
that combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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The Italian Context, Data, Variables, Models and Methods 
The objective of this research is to measure the relationship between firm performance 
and a number of characteristics of boards, including board size, independent directors, the 
CEO/CM duality and ownership composition for Italian companies listed on the STAR segment 
of the Italian Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2015. 
The Italian Context 
The corporate governance system in Italy has unique features that make it an interesting case 
to analyse. Firstly, the Italian governance structure is characterized by the so-called traditional model 
or dualistic ‘horizontal’ model (Fiori, 2003; Alvaro, Ciccaglioni and Sicialiano, 2013; Mallin et al., 
2015; Melis and Zattoni, 2017), i.e. a shareholders’ assembly appoints both the board of directors and 
the supervisory board. The role of the supervisory board is to ensure that laws are observed, and has 
partially remained non-political, i.e. not involved in strategic issues (Melis, 2000). Secondly, the 
Italian stock exchange is mainly dominated by medium enterprises with concentrated ownership 
(Moro Visconti, 2001; Bianchi and Enriques, 2005). Thirdly, the Italian system is characterised by 
the limited role of the financial market; indeed Melis (2000) argues that bank debts are the main 
sources for corporate funding. Fourthly, in the family businesses that constitute 60% of Italian listed 
companies (Aidaf, 2017), the main shareholder is the CEO and/or the Chairman, increasing the risk 
that the largest shareholder may misuse the company’s resources at the expense of the minority and/or 
the firm (Atanason, Black and Ciccotello, 2011). As result, the Italian listed companies face not only 
the principal-agent issue (Fama and Jensen, 1983) but also the principal-principal problem (Melis, 
2000), i.e. conflicts between blockholders and minority shareholders (D’Onza et al., 2014). For this 
reason, in 2005 the Italian legislator (Law 262/2005 - The Protection of Savings) extended the slate 
voting for boards of directors to the Italian Listed companies in order to guarantee that minority 
shareholders have at least one director elected to the board. The Italian corporate governance 
legislation (including soft and hard laws) has experienced substantial changes since 1995. Table 4 
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shows and explains the milestones of the Italian corporate governance legislation from the first 
guideline (1995) to the latest regulation (2016).  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we use several data sources. Firstly, we hand collected data regarding 
corporate governance by analysing each company’s corporate governance reports from 2003-2015. 
Secondly, we hand collected ownership data from the CONSOB database3. In case of missing data in 
either corporate governance reports or the CONSOB database, we analysed another official source 
called ‘Il Calepino dell’Azionista’ issued by MedioBanca4. Thirdly, in order to obtain financial data, 
we used the database DataStream by Thomson Reuters.  
We use a sample of Italian companies listed on the STAR segment in the Italian Main Market 
(MTA), Italian Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2015. The STAR segment is dedicated to 
medium companies that voluntarily comply with requirements of excellence in terms of liquidity, 
information transparency and high quality of corporate governance. Given the emphasis on liquidity, 
information transparency and corporate governance, we considered 73 companies listed on the STAR 
segment in 2015. We eliminated three non-Italian companies (two from Luxemburg and one from 
Switzerland). Consistent with Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010), we 
excluded companies from the financial services sector (five in total), because they are subject to a 
special regulatory environment. The final population is 65 Italian companies listed on the STAR 
segment over 13 years with 731 observations in total. 
  
                                                 
3
 The CONSOB database is available at http://www.consob.it/mainen/issuers/listed_companies/advanced_search/index.html 
4 ‘Il Calepino dell’Azionista’ provides brief reports on all Italian Listed Companies; it is available at 
http://www.mbres.it/en/publications/calepino-dellazionista. 
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Variables measurement 
Dependent Variable. Consistent with prior studies (Bennedsen, Kongsted, Hans and Nielsen, 2004; Dey, 
Engel and Liu, 2011; Donadelli et al., 2014), the dependent variable is the Return on Assets (ROA), 
as measured by income before depreciation divided by fiscal year-end total assets (Hsu, 2010; 
Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). 
Independent Variables. The three main explanatory variables are: board size, independent directors 
and CEO/CM duality. ‘Board Size’5 is measured as the total number of all directors. ‘Independent 
Directors’ is the percentage of independent/nonexecutive directors in management boards6. 
‘CEO/CM Duality’ is a binary variable which takes a value of one if it is found that the CEO also 
serves as the chairman (i.e. CEO/CM duality), and a value of zero otherwise (Zajac and Westphal, 
1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998).  
Control Variables. A number of control variables have been included in the study in order to remove 
the problem of endogeneity. These variables have been used in many prior studies, and are correlated 
with firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Bonn et al., 
2004; Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010). In particular, we 
consider the number of directors appointed by the minority shareholders; the number of roles that 
directors have in other companies; Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets (Eisenberg et al., 1998); Pretax income; Firm age as the number of years since the company 
foundation; Pre crisis period measured as a dummy variable that takes the value one for the years 
before 2008; otherwise zero; Debt as the sum of long and short term debt; market to book value as 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. In line with ownership features of the 
Italian listed companies (Bianchi and Enriques, 2005), other variables are collected, namely CEO and 
shareholder dummy which is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is also a 
                                                 
5
 We also use a dummy variable as a proxy for board size; the dummy variable takes the value of one when the board has at least 7 
members, and zero otherwise. 
6 We do not measure the number of members of the supervisory board, as there is no variation between companies during the period 
analysis. The number of independent directors sitting in the supervisory board is always three. 
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shareholder, otherwise zero (Petrou and Procopiou, 2016); the percentage of shareholder agreements 
over the total firms’ property; ownership concentration (the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder of the company); and ownership composition, which is measured as the percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors, the board, management, governments, the company itself (own 
shares), and banks. Table 5 shows variable definitions and sources. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Models and Methodology 
We develop several models to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
features and firm performance, and validate our hypotheses. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we develop the following model: 
Firm Performance = 0 + 1 Board sizeit + 2 Board sizeit2 + (3 + 1 Board sizeit)Precrisis +  
Control variablesit + it       (1) 
where it is the error term. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, we develop the following model: 
Firm Performance = 0 + 1 Independent Directorsit + 2 Independent Directorsit2 + (3 + 1 
Independent Directorsit)Precrisis + +  Control variablesit + it     (2) 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, we consider the interaction of the board size with the percentage of 
independent directors in the following model: 
Firm Performance = 0 + (1 + 1 Independent Directorsit)Board sizeit +  Control variablesit 
+ it              (3) 
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To test Hypothesis 4,  
Firm Performance =0 + 1 CEO dualityit + (2 +  CEO dualityit)Precrisis +  Control 
variablesit + it           (4) 
 
To validate the previous hypotheses, and in line with previous agency theory studies (e.g. 
Jensen, 1993), we substitute the board size variable with a board size dummy variable, that takes the 
value of one when board has at least seven members (otherwise zero). Therefore, we develop the 
following model: 
Firm Performance = 0 + (1 + 1 Independent Directorsit)Board size_Dummy7it +  Control 
variablesit + it            (5) 
 
Given concerns about Italian ownership composition (Melis, 2000; D’Onza et al., 2014), we 
run models (1)-(5) a second time, where the main dependent and independent variables remain 
unchanged and where the ownership concentration – which is a control variable - is substituted with 
the ownership composition (Institutional Investors, Board ownership, Management, Government, 
Own shares, Bank), CEO_shareholder dummy and shareholder agreements, as part of the control 
variables. By doing that, we then develop models (6), (7), (8) and (9). 
We estimate the models using a panel data methodology and the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), specifically the system GMM estimator, by using Stata14. The advantages of using 
GMM are that it deals with endogeneity (Wintoki, 2007), unobserved heterogeneity and cases where 
explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous 8. Additionally, this approach includes lagged 
performance as an explanatory variable and the other lagged variables (by no more than two periods) 
as instruments that control for both dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity. Consistent with prior 
studies (Glen, Lee and Singh, 2001; Wintoki, 2012), two lags are sufficient to capture the persistence 
of performance and to ensure dynamic completeness (Wintoki, 2012). Therefore, we include two lags 
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in our GMM model. Finally, after running the models, we conduct some specification tests. We run 
a Hansen test that checks for the lack of correlation between the instruments and the random 
disturbance. In order to assess the validity of the instrument variables and the success of the 
instrumentation process in purging the estimates of second order serial correlation (Guest, 2009, p. 
395), the Sargan test and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for second order serial correlation are 
estimated respectively. The diagnostic for the instruments are acceptable, as shown in Table 5 and 6. 
Both Sargan and Arellano and Bond test p-values are insignificant for all models, i.e. our results are 
not influenced by unobserved firms’ effects, simultaneous endogeneity, or dynamic endogeneity. 
Finally, consistent with prior research (Guest, 2009), all the models are run an additional time where 
all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to remove some possible effects of outliers. 
 
Results 
Summary statistics 
Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables. In 
particular, the mean (median) of ROA is 0.03 (0.09). Board size in Italian listed companies ranges 
from five to fifteen directors, with 9.02 (2.49) being the mean (median). The mean board size is below 
the figure of 11.67 reported by de Andres et al. (2005) for 10 OECD countries, and also smaller than 
the fourteen reported by Allegrini and Bianchi Martini (2006) for all Italian listed companies. The 
board size of the present sample appears to be generally larger than that of US companies (Linck et 
al., 2008), which is 7.5, and also the 8.07 reported by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) for the UK. 
Furthermore, 46.5% of companies have CEO/CM duality, meaning that almost half of the firms do 
not comply with the code of corporate governance recommendations (i.e. CEO/CM non-duality). This 
finding also suggests that practice is not consistent with an agency theory approach which encourages 
CEO/CM non-duality (Rechner and Dalton, 1989/1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994a). The average 
number of independent directors sitting on the boards is 3.28 and they represent 36% of the boards, 
which is similar to the 39% reported by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) for the UK, even though in the 
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last decade the proportion of independents in the UK has risen considerably (Pye, 2000), reaching 
50% of all board members (De Andres et al., 2005). The number of independent directors is rather 
low; this has also been criticised by the Association of Italian Joint Stock Companies (Assonime, 
2018). The mean number of directors appointed by the minority shareholders through the slate voting 
is 0.23 with a range from 0 to 3.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
 
Regression results 
Table 7 shows the findings from the estimation of Models 1-4. Column 1 refers to Model 1 
that tests Hypothesis 1; Column 2 refers to Model 2 and tests Hypothesis 2; Column 3 refers to Model 
3 that combines Models 1 and 2; Column 4 refers to Model 3 that tests Hypothesis 3; Column 5 refers 
to Model 4 that tests Hypothesis 4.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
 
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the board size has a positive effect on firm performance for 
lower levels of board size (3.909, p<0.01) and a negative effect on firm performance for higher levels 
of board size (-0.019, p <0.01). This result supports Hypothesis 1. This means that at lower levels of 
board size, directors are more likely to co-operate efficiently; however, when the board size increases, 
the costs related to directors consequentially rise, and firm performance declines. Additionally, we 
find that the higher the commitments of directors in other companies (board roles), the lower the firm 
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performance, as confirmed in the columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table 7. This suggests that if directors 
spend a lot of time and effort in other firms, they are less likely to take the right decisions to maximise 
performance. Consequently, directors should limit their commitments in other companies in order to 
concentrate on corporate decisions in a given firm. In this context, an adequate board size could 
improve the efficacy of the decision-making process due to information sharing (Lehn et al., 2009), 
allowing the board to take the right decisions that maximise firm performance. In the volatile context 
in which STAR companies operate, a larger board size is not justified, because directors have to spend 
significant time and effort on decisions that may affect firm performance. These findings are 
consistent with the Italian (soft and hard) laws of Corporate Governance that recommend an adequate 
number of directors.  
In the light of the above, our results seem to confirm that a large board of directors could lead 
to:  
 problems of coordination and communication, because it is difficult to arrange 
board meetings, reach consensus, causing slow transfer of information and a less-efficient 
decision-making process (Judge and Zeithamal, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Bonn et al., 2004; Cheng, 
2008),  
 problems in terms of board cohesiveness, because directors may be less likely 
to share a common goal and to communicate with each other (Evans and Dion, 1991; Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992), causing greater levels of conflict (Goodstein et al., 1994); 
 free rider problems because the cost to any individual board member of not 
exercising diligence falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Guest, 2009); 
 greater agency costs, because if board size increases beyond a certain number, 
disadvantages greatly outweigh the initial advantages of having more directors to draw on, 
causing a lower level of corporate performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
Column 2 of Table 7 also shows that the percentage of independent directors has a positive 
effect on firms’ performance (0.771 and p < 0.05). Thus, the results support Hypothesis 2. More 
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interestingly, we find that the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect on firm 
performance (0.771 and p < 0.05) for lower levels of independent directors and a negative effect on 
firms’ performance (-0.059 and p<0.05) for higher levels of independent directors. We find the same 
results by combining Model 1 and Model 2 (as shown in Column 3). Our findings are in line with the 
prescription of the Italian Corporate Governance laws that recommends an adequate number of 
independent directors sitting on the board. Additionally, these findings are consistent with those 
displayed in prior research (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008). Our negative result could be explained by the fact that independent directors’ compliance with 
Italian hard and soft laws of Corporate Governance has meant increased costs which have had a 
negative impact on firm performance.  
Another possible reason for the negative impact of a higher number of independent directors 
on firm performance could be explained by the fact that they might not be so effective in their role 
because CEOs may employ several tactics to neutralise the power of independent directors (Peng, 
2004). For instance, CEOs – if part of the majority - could appoint directors with experience on other 
passive boards and exclude those with experience on more active boards (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
CEOs may also appoint directors who are from strategically irrelevant backgrounds who do not have 
the knowledge base to challenge the CEO’s power and to effectively take part in strategic decision 
making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Alternatively, CEOs may appoint independent directors who 
are more sympathetic to the Chief Executive (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). So, once again, it could be 
reasonable to note that the potential lack of independence of outside directors could lead to a 
worsening of performance. Additionally, we find that the effects of minority directors (who are all 
independents) on performance is insignificant; this means that their appointments have no impact on 
firms’ performance, probably due to the lack of power they have. Even though independent directors 
should play a crucial role in effective governance of the firm, they may not be able to fulfil their 
duties effectively and to maximize firm performance. Independent directors could thus affect firm 
performance in a negative manner; they could make decisions that do not maximize firm performance 
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in order to avoid hindering controlling shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, we ran another test to 
verify the existence of a U- shaped relationship between board size and proportion of independent 
directors (t-value = 2.37; p<0.01), as shown in Figure 1. We found a non-linear relationship between 
the level of independent directors and the board size. Particularly, board size first decreases with the 
proportion of independent directors at a decreasing rate to reach a minimum, after which board size 
increases at an increasing rate as the proportion of independent directors continues to rise. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Column 4 of Table 7 shows that the moderating effect of independent directors in the board size-firm 
performance relationship is negative and significant (-0.959, p<0.01). Our result supports Hypothesis 
3. This means that increasing the proportion of independent directors relative to board size appears 
to increase the likelihood that firms’ performance will worsen. Presumably, directors, having 
additional roles in other companies, have less time to commit to a given company. This is confirmed 
by the negative and significant effect of the roles of the board on firms’ performance. Furthermore, 
the negative impact of the interaction (between board size and independent directors) on firms’ 
performance stresses the importance of having a balanced board composition. As shown by Figure 2 
(following Albers, 2012; Kostyshak, 2015), we found an inverted-U shaped relationship between firm 
performance and the moderating effects of independent directors on the board size. This confirms 
that the proportion of independent directors moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
the board size and firm performance. In other words, firm performance increases with the interaction 
between board size and independent directors at a decreasing rate to reach a maximum, after which 
firm performance decreases.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Additionally, in line with some previous agency theory research (Jensen 1993), it has been 
argued that board size should not exceed seven directors. We therefore introduce a dummy variable 
to represent board size: Dummy_7 takes the value of 1 when the board size is more than 7, otherwise 
0. Column 6 of Table 7 shows that these findings are also supported when the dummy variable of 
board size (Dummy_7) is used as an independent. Particularly, the effects of board size and 
independent directors, and their interaction on firms’ performance, are supported when the board is 
composed of 7 or more directors.  
Columns 5 of Table 7 show that there are no significant effects of CEO/CM duality on firms’ 
performance7. This result does not support Hypothesis 4. Consistent with Coles and Hesterly (2000), 
and Krause, Semadeni and Cannella (2014), CEO/CM duality and CEO/CM non-duality do not differ 
in their effect on firm performance. This suggests that CEO/CM duality is a more complex issue than 
the simple splitting of roles. The duality is not a random phenomenon (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005: 
786), because it depends on different and not easily measurable factors, such as the presence of 
powerful CEOs who over-ride board members, CEO personality, his/her beliefs, values, priorities, 
personal characteristics and principles. Furthermore, the CEO/CM duality may also depend on other 
factors which in part recede from agency approach, such as a solution to environmental resource 
scarcity, complexity and dynamism, and conformity to institutional pressures. Our results confirm 
that there is no single optimal leadership structure, as both duality and separation perspectives have 
related costs and benefits (Brickley et al., 1997). The lack of significance may be due to the balancing 
effects between costs and benefits of CEO/CM duality. The potential monitoring benefits of non-
duality imply the separation of management and control. The potential costs of non-duality relate to 
information asymmetry, inconsistent decisions, and extra remuneration in maintaining two directors. 
                                                 
7 We also find a lack of effects on firms’ performance when the Chairman is an executive director, or when a an executive director 
(other than a CEO, like a CFO) acts as a Chairman.  These results are available on request. 
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Thus, it confirms that it may be overly simplistic to argue that CEO/CM duality is uniformly good or 
bad for firm performance. Even though CEO/CM duality may indeed reduce board independence 
(Rhoades et al., 2001), this does not necessarily mean that the firms with CEO/CM duality will 
perform worse than CEO/CM non-duality companies. On the other hand, firms with CEO/CM duality 
may benefit from having strong and consistent leadership at the top, and may minimize some costs 
of conflicts between the CEO and the board. CEO/CM duality may provide the firm with strong 
leadership and consistent vision fundamental for firm success.  
Given the particular ownership composition of Italian listed companies, we ran further 
analysis on ownership composition (Granado-Peiró and López-Gracia, 2016). In particular, we ran 
models 1-5 a second time while substituting the shareholder concentration variable with six 
shareholder composition variables (including Institutional Investors, Board ownership, Management, 
Government, Own shares and Bank), CEO_shareholder dummy and the percentage of shareholder 
agreements. Table 8 shows that there is no relationship between ownership composition and firm 
performance, even in the presence of shareholder agreements. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Some research points out that results may be driven by industry factors (Cho et al., 2014) and 
years of analysis. We therefore control for industry and year by introducing dummy variables and we 
find that the results confirm our previous findings (results are available from the authors on request). 
Additionally, we introduce a post crisis dummy that has insignificant effects on firm performance for 
all models. Finally, in order to minimise the effects of outliers, we additionally ran all the models a 
second time where all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile (Guest, 2009); all results 
are confirmed, and are available on request. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
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This research studies the effects of the main corporate governance characteristics (board size, 
the independence of the board and CEO/CM duality) on firm performance among Italian listed 
companies by adopting an agency theory approach. We use a sample of Italian listed companies that 
adopt the best corporate governance practices: those firms listed in the STAR segment over the period 
from 2003 to 2015. This research uncovers a number of interesting results that have implications for 
both scholars and practitioners with an interest in corporate governance issues.  
This research contributes to the understanding of the Italian corporate governance where 
agency theory assumptions need to be ‘relaxed’ and adapted to this interesting context. Particularly, 
this paper contributes to the literature on agency theory and listed companies (Di Pietra et al. 2008; 
D’Onza et al., 2014) by reconciling some of the conflicting results and explaining some new Italian 
corporate governance insights. Our findings also help to cast light on some of the conflicting results 
in prior research (Melis, 2000; Allegrini and Greco, 2011) inherent in the board structure-performance 
relation. 
First, we find that board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of 
board size, and negative effects on performance for higher levels of board size. This finding highlights 
that the board of directors should be of an adequate size – but not too large, considering that a largers 
boardroom does not necessarily result in positive performance. This may be due to the fact that the 
higher the number of directors on a board, the higher the likelihood that they have other external 
commitments in other companies. We find that the higher the number of roles held by directors, the 
lower the firm performance. Therefore, our results highlight that there is no ideal agency-theory 
archetype model of corporate governance (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009) in Italy. In particular, this 
study emphasises that when deciding upon board size, shareholders (who appoint directors) should 
take into consideration that the higher the number of directors, the higher the likelihood of them 
having other external commitments, and hence the higher the possibility that their presence on the 
board may negatively affect firm performance.  
Second, we find that the board of directors, despite the agency theory assumptions, does not 
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necessarily benefit from a high number of independent directors; rather a more balanced composition 
of the board is beneficial. In this respect, the percentage of independent directors has a positive effect 
on firm performance for lower levels of independents and negative effects on firm performance for 
higher levels of independents. Our results suggest that the agency theory assumptions in the Italian 
context need to be reconsidered; confirming that independent directors on the board play a prominent 
role, but they do not have to be higher in number than executives. On the other hand, we find no 
evidence that the ownership concentration and composition (although they are not our main 
independent variables) have any effect on firms’ performance. This means that large shareholders 
may neutralise the costs and benefits of their influence/activity on performance. This again suggests 
that the legislator should introduce better regulation in order to control the costs and benefits 
associated with large ownership.  
Third, the leadership structure (CEO/CM duality) does not seem to play a significant role in 
affecting the firms’ performance. This reconciles the contrasting results of previous research (Krause 
et al., 2014): CEO/CM duality is ‘not a random phenomenon’ (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005, p. 786), 
especially in Italy where CEO and/or Chair can be the main shareholder and, therefore, it does not 
appear to have an impact if their roles are split. This means that the CEO duality as a corporate 
governance mechanism is not sufficient on its own to show the benefits of having a divided role 
between the CEO and the CM, despite the suggestions of the Italian corporate governance code. 
Therefore, it may be opportune to consider that each company has its own characteristics where the 
benefits of the CEO/CM (non) duality may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each 
company. In effect, when the relationship between a CEO and a CM is not productive, it may lead to 
major governance problems (Cadbury, 2002) and therefore to worse firm performance.  
This research has several implications for practice. Most importantly, the composition of the 
board and the number and type of directors is less important than the quality and potential contribution 
of individuals. This is an issue for both regulators and investors. The 2005 Italian legislator extended 
the slate voting for board of directors of listed companies in order to assure that minority shareholders 
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can appoint their representative to the board. We find that these minority directors, who are all 
independents, do not appear to have any impact on firms’ performance. This raises the issue of 
whether they are sufficiently powerful to protect the minority’s interests and whether these directors 
are ineffective in preventing exploitation by the major shareholders. We suggest that the Italian 
corporate governance law should enhance the rules and the effectiveness of the minority directors by 
controlling whether they are actually able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private 
benefits at the expense of the minority. Investors and owners also have a role to play in ensuring that 
independent directors in particular are selected for their experience and strength of character. They 
must also have the time and commitment to act in the best interests of both minority and majority 
investors. Secondly, ensuring the separation of the CEO/CM roles as a control for enhanced corporate 
governance does not stand up to examination. Our findings suggest that a more important control is 
to ensure the appointment of effective board members. 
This research points to some interesting avenues for future research. First, it may be important 
to consider a more comprehensive theoretical framework, such as multiple agency theory (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz and Johnson, 2008) which adopts a more holistic view of corporate governance 
issues. Indeed, it combines different theories starting from agency assumptions (Merendino and 
Sarens, 2016). Second, we measure firm performance using ROA as a proxy, which is consistent with 
previous works (Yermack, 1996, Bebchuck and Cohen 2005). However, it would be worthwhile to 
consider other firm performance measures, such as Economic Value Added (Elali, 2006; Adjaoud, 
Zeghal and Andaleeb, 2007). Thirdly, due to methodological issues this study focused only on the 
role and composition of the management board. A more appropriate method for examining the 
supervisory board may be a qualitative study of individual board members and their stakeholders. 
Finally, a future study may include other variables, which could help explain the relationship between 
board of director structures, controlling mechanisms and their impact on firms’ performance. Other 
variables which could be tested include the level of expertise (Chan and Li, 2008), education, 
professional background and the number of meetings per year that directors have. 
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While this research offers several insights into the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, some limitations should be pointed out. First, we study Italian listed 
companies; it would also be interesting to study and compare other institutional settings, such as 
Italian non-listed companies. Second, we consider the main board characteristics (composition, size, 
number of roles, number of shares per director) and the firms features (age, year of listing, family 
business, size, sectors); however, future research could also take into account other variables relating 
to boards of directors, such as CEO and independent directors’ tenure, age, experience, education, 
nationality of directors in Italian listed companies and cognitive capabilities. 
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Table 1 International Empirical Research on Board size 
 Author Publication Year 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
1.  Adams and Mehran 
 
2003 Board size 
Tobin’s Q, market-
to-book ratio 
35 publicly traded 
bank holding 
companies 
1986-1996 
1997-1999 
Positive relationship 
2.  
Allam 2018 Board size ROA and Q ratio FTSE All-Share Index  2005-2011 Positive relationship 
3.  
Assenga et al.  2018 Board size ROA, ROE 
80+12 Tanzanian 
listed companies 
2006-2013 No relationship 
4.  Basu et al. 
 
2007 Board size 
Accounting 
performance 
174 large Japanese 
companies 
1992-1996 
Negative 
performance – Large 
boards destroy 
corporate value 
5.  
Beiner et al. 2006 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Swiss Public listed 
companies 
2001 
No consistent 
relationship 
6.  
Belkhir 2004 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
USA financial 
companies 
1995-2002 
No convincing 
evidence 
7.  
Bennedsen et al. 2004 Board size ROA Danish companies 1999 
Non-linear 
relationship 
8.  
Bhagat and Black 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q 
USA Large Public 
companies 
1988-1993 
No consistent 
relationship 
9.  
Bozec and Dia 2007 Board size Technical efficiency 
Canadian Public 
owned companies 
1976-2001 
Large companies is 
more effective at 
coping with a 
complex and 
uncertain 
environment 
10.  
Cheng 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
USA listed 
companies 
1996-2004 
Firm with large 
boards of directors 
have less variable 
performance 
11.  
Coles et al. 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q 
USA large 
companies 
1992-2001 
Positive relationship 
(Tobin’s Q increases 
in board size for 
complex firms) 
12.  
Conyon and Peck 1998 Board size ROE UK listed companies 1991-1994 Negative relationship 
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13.  
Dalton et al. 1999 Board size 
Market based 
measures 
Us companies 
Meta-analysis of 27 
studies with a total of 
131 companies 
Positive relationship 
14.  
de Andres et al. 2005 Board size 
Market-to-book ratio 
Tobin’s Q 
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 
1996 Negative relationship 
15.  
de Andres et al. 2005 Board size 
Tobin’s Q, Market to 
book value 
10 OECD countries 
companies 
1996 Negative relationship 
16.  
Donadelli et al. 2014 Board size ROA 
Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK and 
US 
2002-2012 
Negative relationship 
(especially in 
corruption-sensitive 
industries) 
17.  
Di Pietra et al. 2008 Board size Share price 
Italian non-financial 
listed companies 
1993-2000 Limited relationship 
18.  
Dwivedi and Jain 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q, 
340 large, listed 
Indian firms - 24 
industry groups. 
1997–2001 Positive relationship 
19.  
Ehikioya 2009 Board size 
ROA, ROE, PE and 
Tobin’s Q 
107 firms quoted in 
the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange 
1998-2002 Positive relationship 
20.  
Eisenberg et al. 1998 Board size ROA 
Small and midsize 
Finnish firms 
1992-1998 
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect) 
21.  
Guest 2009 Board size 
Profitability, share 
returns, Tobin’s Q 
2,746 UK listed 
firms 
1981-2002 Negative relationship 
22.  
Huther 1997 Board size Total variable cost 
US Electricity 
companies 
1994 Negative relationship 
23.  
Jensen 1993 Board size 
RandD, capital 
expenditures, 
depreciation, 
dividends, market 
value 
1,431 firms on 
COMPUSTAT 
1979-1990 Negative relationship 
24.  
Kamran et al. 2006 Board size Earnings New Zealand firms 1991-1997 Negative relationship 
25.  
Kao et al.  2018 Board size 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q, Market-to-book 
value of equity  
151 Taiwanese 
Listed companies 
1997-2015 Negative relationship 
26.  
Kathuria and Dash 1999 Board size ROA 
504 Indian 
companies belonging 
to 18 industries 
1994-1995 Positive relationship 
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27.  
Kaymak and Bektas 2008 Board size ROA Turkish banks 2001-2004 No relationship 
28.  
Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
Australian Public 
listed companies 
1996 
Positive relationship 
(board size is 
correlated positively 
with market value) 
29.  
Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size ROA, Tobin’s Q 
348 of Australia’s 
largest publicly listed 
companies 
1996 Positive relationship 
30.  
Klein 2002 Board size abnormal accruals 
SandP 500 Sample 
US 
1992–1993 Positive relationship 
31.  
Larmou and Vafeas 2009 Board size 
Market to book 
value, Raw stock 
return, Abnormal 
return 
Firms with poor 
operating 
performance 
1994-2000 Positive relationship 
32.  
Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q Swiss firms 
1980-1995 interval 5 
years 
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect 
33.  
Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size ROA Swiss firms 
1980-1995 interval 5 
years 
No consistent 
relationship 
34.  
Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size 
Market value of 
equity 
All firms traded on 
Switzerland Stock 
Exchange 
1980,1985,1990, 
1995 
Negative relationship 
35.  Mak and Kusnadi 
 
2005 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Singapore Public 
Listed companies 
1995-1996 
Negative relationship 
(using OLS) – No 
consistent 
relationship (using 
2SLS) 
36.  
Mak and Kusnadi 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q 
230 Singapore firms 
and 230 Malaysian 
firms 
1999-2000 Negative relationship 
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8 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period. 
37.  O’Connell and 
Cramer 
2009 Board size 
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET
8
 
Irish listed 
companies 
2001 Negative relationship 
38.  
Ødegaard and 
Bøhren 
 
2003 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Norwegian Public 
listed companies 
1989-1997 
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect) 
39.  Postma  van Ees and 
Sterken 
2003 Board size 
ROA, ROS, ROE, 
Market To Book 
Value 
Dutch manufacturing 
companies 
1996 
Negative relationship 
(negative board size 
effect 
40.  
Rashid 2018 Board size EBIT 
135 listed firms on 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange  
2006-2011 Positive relationship 
41.  Rodriguez-Fernandez 
et al. 
2014 Board size 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q 
121 companies from 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange  
2009 Positive  relationship 
42.  
Yermack 1996 Board size 
ROA, ROS, Tobin’s 
Q 
US Large companies 1984-1991 
Inverse (negative) 
relationship 
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Table 2 International Empirical Research on Independent Directors 
 Author Publication Year 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
43.  Agoraki et al. 2009 
Independent 
directors 
Stochastic frontier 
model 
57 large European 
banks 
2002-2006 Inverted U-shaped 
44.  Agrawal and Knober 1996 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 400 US companies 1983-1987 Negative relationship 
45.  Allam 2018 
Independent 
directors 
ROA and Q ratio FTSE All-Share Index  2005-2011 NO relationship 
46.  Assenga et al.  2018 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE 
80+12 Tanzanian 
listed companies 
2006-2013 Positive relationship 
47.  Barnhart and 
Rosenstein 
1998 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
321 firms from 
Standard and Poor’s 
500 dataset 
1990 Positive relationship 
48.  Baysinger and Butler 1985 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q US 266 firms 1970-1980 No relationship 
49.  Baysinger and Butler 1985 
Independent 
directors 
ROE US 266 firms 1970-1980 Positive relationship 
50.  Beasley 1996 
Independent 
directors 
Accounting fraud 
US 75 fraud and US 
75 no-fraud firms 
1980-1991 
Negative relationship 
(ID reduces likely of 
fraud) 
51.  Bhagat and Black 1998 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
market adjusted 
stock price returns 
334 large US public 
corporations 
1985-1995 
No convincing 
evidence 
52.  Bhagat and Black 2002 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
Ratio of sales to 
assets, Market 
934 large US public 
corporations 
1988-1991 No relationship 
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adjusted stock price 
returns 
 
53.  Borokhovich et al. 1996 
Independent 
directors 
Abnormal returns 
969 CEO successions 
at 588 large public 
firms 
1970-1988 Positive relationship 
54.  Brickley et al. 1994 
Independent 
directors 
Stock market 
reaction 
247 firms adopting 
poison pills 
1984-1986 Positive relationship 
55.  Bhatt et al. 2018 2018 
Independent 
directors 
ROI, ROE, RCI 
Malaysian listed 
companies 
2008-2013 
Positive relationship 
(Independent 
directors calculated 
within a CG index) 
56.  Brown and Caylor 2006 
Independent 
directors 
ROE, profit margins, 
dividend yields, 
stock repurchases 
1868 US firms Stock 
Exchange 
2003 Positive relationship 
57.  Byrd and Hickman 1992 
Independent 
directors 
Abnormal stock 
returns 
128 tender offer bids 1980-1987 Positive relationship 
58.  Campa, Marra 2008 
Independent 
directors 
ROI 
Italian Listed 
companies 
2005-2006 Positive relationship 
59.  Cotter et al. 1997 
Independent 
directors 
Target shareholders 
gains; tender offer 
premium 
169 tender offer 
target – traded on 
NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ 
1989-1992 Positive relationship 
60.  Daily and Dalton 1992 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
100 fastest-growing 
small publicly held 
US firms 
1990 Positive relationship 
61.  
De Andres and 
Vallelado 
 
2008 
Independent 
directors 
market-to-book value 
ratio 
69 commercial banks 
from six OECD 
countries (Canada, 
the US, and the UK, 
1996–2006 Inverted U-shaped 
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Spain, France, and 
Italy). 
62.  de Andres et al. 2005 
Independent 
directors 
Market-to-book ratio 
Tobin’s Q 
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 
1996 No relationship 
63.  Donadelli et al. 2014 
Independent 
directors 
ROA 
Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, UK and 
US 
2002-2012 
Positive relationship 
(especially in 
corruption-sensitive 
industries) 
64.  Dulewicz and 
Herbert 
2004 
Independent 
directors 
Cash Flow Return on 
Total Assets, Sales 
Return 
137 Manufacturing, 
Transport, Service 
Sector UK firms 
1997 No relationship 
65.  El Mir and Sebui 2008 
Independent 
directors 
EVA 357 us firms 1998-2004 Positive relationship 
66.  Elloumi andGueyie 2001 
Independent 
directors 
financial distress 
status of the firm 
92 Canadian publicly 
traded firms, 
1994-1998 
Small likelihood of 
financial distress 
(with proportion of 
higher ID) 
67.  Erickson et al. 2005 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
Canadian public 
firms 
1993-1997 Negative relationship 
68.  Ezzamel andWatson 1993 
Independent 
directors 
Return on capital 
employed 
113 UK companies 1982-1985 Positive relationship 
69.  Hermalin and 
Weisbach 
1991 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
142 NYSE 
companies 
--- No relationship 
70.  Hill and Snell 1988 
Independent 
directors 
Value added per 
employee, ROE, 
122 Fortune 500 
firms 
1979-1981 Positive relationship 
71.  Hossain et al. 2001 
Independent 
directors 
Firm performance 
New Zealand 
companies 
Before and after 
1994 
Positive relationship 
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72.  Kaplan and Minton 1994 
Independent 
directors 
Company stock 
returns, sales growth, 
change in pre-tax 
income 
119 traded Japanese 
companies 
1981 Positive relationship 
73.  Kaplan and Reishus 1990 
Independent 
directors 
dividend 101 companies 1979-1973 Positive relationship 
74.  Klein 1998 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, market value of 
equity minus ROA, 
market returns 
485 US firms listed on 
the SandP 500 
1992-1993 
Insignificant 
relationship 
75.  Klein 2002 
Independent 
directors 
Earnings management 692 US listed companies 1992-1993 Negative relationship 
76.  Kao et al.  2018 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, 
Market-to-book value 
of equity  
151 Taiwanese Listed 
companies 
1997-2015 Positive relationship 
77.  Laing and Weir 1999 
Independent 
directors 
ROA 
115 randomly selected 
UK listed companies 
1992, 1995 
No significant 
relationship 
78.  Mehran 1995 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA 153 manufacturing firms 1979-1980 
Insignificant 
relationship 
79.  O’Connell and 
Cramer 
2009 
Independent 
directors 
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET
9
 
Iris listed companies 2001 Positive relationship 
80.  Pearce and Zahra 1992 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Earnings 
per share 
119 Fortune 500 
industrial companies 
1983-1989 Positive relationship 
81.  Rashid 2018 
Independent 
directors 
EBIT 135 listed firms on Dhaka 
Stock Exchange  
2006-2011 No relationship 
82.  Rodriguez-
Fernandez et al. 
2014 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q 121 companies from 
Madrid Stock Exchange  
2009 
Insignificant 
relationship 
                                                 
9 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period. 
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83.  Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 
1990 
Independent 
directors 
Stock prices reaction US listed companies 1981-1985 
Positive relationship 
between stock prices 
and announcement of 
new IDs 
84.  Schellenger et al. 1989 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, RET, risk-
adjusted shareholder’s 
annualized total marker 
return on investment 
750 firms listed on the 
Compustat Industrial 
1986-1987 Positive relationship 
85.  Uribe-Bohorquez et 
al. 
2018 
Independent 
directors 
Efficiency 
2185  companies 
International Sample 
2006 to 2015  Positive relationship 
86.  Vafeas and 
Theodorou 
1998 
Independent 
directors 
Market-to-book ratio, 
ROA 
250 UK publicly traded 
firms 
1994 No relationship 
87.  Weisbach 1988 
Independent 
directors 
Stock returns, earnings, 367 US listed companies 1974-1983 Positive relationship 
88.  Yermack 1996 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROS, Tobin’s Q Us Large companies 1984-1991 Negative relationship 
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Table 3 International Empirical Research on CEO/CM duality 
 
Author Publication Year 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
75.  
Abatecola et al. 2011 CEO/CM duality --- 
40 quantitative 
articles published in 
26 journals 
1985-2008 Positive relationship 
76.  
Abdullah 2004 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, ROE, EPD, 
profit margins 
Kuala Lumpur Listed 
Companies 
1994-1996 No relationship 
77.  
Allam 2018 CEO/CM duality ROA and Q ratio FTSE All-Share Index  2005-2011 NO relationship 
78.  
Assenga et al.  2018 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE 
80+12 Tanzanian 
listed companies 
2006-2013 Negative relationship 
79.  
Baliga et al. 1996 
CEO/CM duality 
(the announcement 
effect of changes in 
duality structure on 
organizational 
performance) 
Daily excess returns 
of stocks are selected 
as they are measures 
of organizational 
performance 
Fortune 500 
companies 
1980-1981 
Superior 
performance for firm 
Split CEO-chair 
position. Positive 
relationship 
1) the market is 
indifferent to 
changes in a firm’s 
duality status, 
2) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect on 
the firm’s operating 
performance; 
3) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect on 
the firm’s long-term 
performance 
80.  
Ballinger and Marcel 2010 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
bankruptcy 
540 CEO succession 
events at SandP 1500 
firms 
1996-1998 
Poor negative effect 
of interim CEO 
successions 
81.  
Berg and Smith 1978 CEO/CM duality 
ROI, ROE, stock 
price 
Fortune 200 firms --- 
Negative relationship 
of duality with ROI, 
and no relation with 
ROE or change in 
stock price 
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82.  
Boyd 1995 CEO/CM duality ROI 
192 publicly traded 
US companies 
1980-1984 Positive relationship 
83.  
Brickley et al. 1997 CEO/CM duality 
ROI, Stock return, 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
661 US firms in the 
1989 Forbes 
compensation 
1989 
Firm with separate 
leadership do not 
perform better. 
Duality firms 
associated with 
better accounting 
performance 
84.  
Bhatt et al. 2018 2018 CEO/CM duality ROI, ROE, RCI 
Malaysian listed 
companies 
2008-2013 
Positive relationship 
(CEO duality 
calculated within a 
CG index) 
85.  Cannella and 
Lubatkin 
 
1993 CEO/CM duality ROE 
472 succession 
events 
1971-1985 
Weak positive 
relation of duality 
with ROE 
86.  
Chaganti et al. 1985 CEO/CM duality No firm performance 
Banking industry – 
comparing 21 
bankrupts firms with 
21 surviving firms 
1987-1990 No relationship 
87.  Daily 
 
1995 CEO/CM duality 
Outcomes of 
bankruptcy: 
successful 
reorganization 
(good), liquidation 
(bad) 
70 publicly traded 
firms filing for 
bankruptcy 
protection 
1980-1986 
No effect on firm 
performance 
88.  
Daily and Dalton 1992 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
100 fastest-growing 
small publicly held 
US firms 
1990 No relationship 
89.  Daily and Dalton 
 
1994a CEO/CM duality bankruptcy 
114 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms 
1972-1982 
Negative effect on 
performance 
90.  Daily and Dalton 
 
1994b CEO/CM duality bankruptcy 
100 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms 
1990 
No main effect on 
firm performance, 
but strengthened the 
positive effect of 
board independence 
on firm performance 
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91.  
Dalton and Kesner 1993, 1987 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
186 small publicly 
traded US firm. 
Randomly selected 
of 50 large Japanese, 
United Kingdom and 
United States 
industrial 
corporations for a 
total sample of 150 
1990,1986 
CEO/CM duality n 
performance 
negative 
relationship1) In 
Japan, it is evidently 
unusual for the same 
individual to serve as 
CEO and chairperson 
of the board. 2) This 
is much more 
frequent in United 
Kingdom 
92.  
Dalton et al. 1998 CEO/CM duality 
Market and 
accounting 
performance 
indicators 
Meta-analysis of 31 
studies US 
companies (69 
samples, N= 12,915) 
1987 
NO overall 
relationship with 
firm performance 
93.  
Davidson et al. 2001 CEO/CM duality 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
421 CEO succession 
event at 332 
Businessweek 1000 
firms 
1992 
CEO-board chair 
consolidation has 
negative effect only 
if heir apparent is no 
present 
94.  
Dey et al. 2011 CEO/CM duality ROA 
760 companies from 
Compustat and 
ExecuComp 
databases 
2001-2009 Positive relationship 
95.  
Donaldson and Davis 1991 CEO/CM duality ROE, stock return 
329 and 321 US 
companies 
1988 Positive relationship 
96.  
Duru et al. 2016 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE, ROS 
17,282 US 
Companies 
1997–2011  Negative relationship 
97.  
Elsayed 2007 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q 
92 firms from 
Egyptian Capital 
Market Agency 
2000-2004 
No significant 
relationship 
98.  Faleye 
 
2007 CEO/CM duality Tobin’s Q 3,823 US firms 1995 
Dual leadership 
increases Tobin’s q 
only in complex 
firms 
99.  Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 
1994 
CEO/CM duality and 
board vigilance 
ROA 
Fortune 200 
companies 
1984 and 1986 
This association 
changes with 
circumstances-with a 
vigilant board 
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considering duality 
to be less desirable 
when firm 
performance is good 
and the CEO 
possesses substantial 
information power. 
100. He and Wang 
 
2009 CEO/CM duality Market to book ratio 
215 large US 
manufacturing firms 
1996-1999 
Strengthened 
positive effect of 
innovative 
knowledge assets on 
firm performance 
101. 
Kao et al.  2018 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q, Market-to-book 
value of equity  
151 Taiwanese 
Listed companies 
1997-2015 Negative relationship 
102. Krause and 
Semadeni 
2013 CEO/CM duality 
Stock return, mean 
analyst rating 
1,053 SandP 1500 
and Fortune 1000 
firms 
2002-2006 
CEO-board chair 
separation has 
positive effect 
following negative 
weak performance; 
nut negative effect 
following strong 
performance 
103. 
Lam and Lee 2008 CEO/CM duality 
ROA; ROE; return 
on capital employed, 
market-to-book 
value of equity 
Hong Kong listed 
companies 
2003/2004 
Positive relationship 
in non-family 
companies. No 
significant 
relationship in family 
companies 
104. 
Mallette and Fowler 1992 CEO/CM duality ROE 
673 publicly traded 
U.S. 
industrial 
manufacturing 
firms 
1985 and 1988 
Weak positive 
relationship of 
duality with roe 
105. Mueller and Barker 
III 
1997 CEO/CM duality ROA 
US manufacturing 
listed firms 
1977–1993 Positive relationship 
106. Palmon and Wald 
 
2002 
CEO/CM duality 
announcements 
abnormal returns 
304 companies from 
COMPUSTAT 
1986-1999 
Small firms = 
negative abnormal 
returns when 
changing from dual 
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to separate 
leadership. Large 
firms=positive 
abnormal returns 
107. 
Peel and O’Donnell 1995 CEO/CM duality 
Ownership of equity 
and participation in 
share 
132 UK industrial 
firms 
1992 Negative relationship 
108. Petrou and 
Procopiou 
2016 CEO/CM duality 
Earnings 
management 
(discretionary 
accruals) 
US public firms  1993-2010 Positive relationship 
109. Pi and Timme 
 
1993 CEO/CM duality ROA 112 US bank 1987-1990 
Positive relationship 
– Superior 
performance for firm 
Split CEO-chair 
position 
110. Quigley and 
Hambrick 
 
2012 CEO/CM duality ROA, stock return 
181 CEO succession 
events at publicly 
traded US high-
technology firms 
1994-2006 
Former CEO staying 
on as board chair 
reduced performance 
change following a 
CEO succession 
111. Rodriguez-
Fernandez et al. 
2014 CEO/CM duality 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q 
121 companies from 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange  
2009 
Insignificant 
relationship 
112. 
Rechner and Dalton 1989 CEO/CM duality Shareholder return 
141 Fortune 500 
firms 
1978-1983 No relationship 
113. 
Rechner and Dalton 1991 CEO/CM duality 
ROE, ROI, profit 
margin 
141 Fortune 500 
firms 
1978-1983 
CEO/CM duality and 
performance 
negative relationship 
114. 
Rhoades et al. 2001 CEO/CM duality various 
Meta-analysis of 
following database: 
Business, 
Psychology, 
Economics and 
Public Affairs 
Business (1971-
1996), Psychology 
(1974-1996), 
Economics (1966-
1996) and Public 
Affairs (1972-1996) 
Positive relationship 
115. 
Worrell et al. 1997 CEO/CM duality 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
522 CEO plurality-
creating events at 
438 Businessweek 
1000 firms 
1972-1980 
Consolidation of 
CEO and board chair 
roles had negative 
effect 
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116. 
Yang and Zhao 2013 CEO/CM duality 
Tobin’s Q, ROE, 
ROA, EBIT 
Canada-United 
States Free Trade 
Agreement (1989) 
1988-1998 
Duality firms 
outperform non-
duality ones 
no relationship 
(ROE, ROA) 
117. Yasser and Al 
Mamun  
2015 CEO/CM duality ROA, ROE 
Australian, 
Malaysian and 
Pakistani  
2011-2013 No relationship 
118. 
Yermack 1996 CEO/CM duality 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ROS 
US Large companies 1984-1991 Positive relationship 
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Table 4 The Chronological Evolution of corporate governance in Italy 
Year Name of the Legislation Issuing Body Description 
1995 
 
‘The project of Corporate 
Governance for Italy’ 
 
A scientific committee in 
collaboration with 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
It identifies the key elements for good practice of 
corporate governance, such as roles, responsibilities of 
stakeholders.  
It aligns with the CoSo Report 
1997 CONSOB 
Communication No. 
DAC/RM/97001574 
CONSOB
10
 (National 
Commission for Companies 
and Stock Exchange) 
It becomes compulsory for boards of directors of listed 
companies to monitor internal corporate governance and 
the roles assigned to executives  
1998 The Draghi Law 
(Legislative Decree No. 
58/1998 - Consolidated 
law on financial 
intermediation) 
The Government – the 
Parliament 
It tackles some corporate governance key issues, i.e. 
investors’ protection, securities offering, takeover bids, 
disclosure obligations and audit firms. 
1999 The Preda Code Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
 
It is a voluntary code of best practice and completes the 
Draghi Law by providing recommendations on the board 
of statutory auditors and on boards of directors’ roles, 
composition and methods of appointment.  
2001 Legislative Decree No 
231 
‘Criminal liability of 
legal entities’ 
The Government – the 
Parliament 
It provides for a direct liability of legal entities, 
companies and associations for certain crimes 
committed by their representatives/directors and 
introduces corporate compliance programmes which are 
mandatory only for companies listed on the STAR 
segment in the Milan Stock exchange. 
2002 Update of the Preda Code  Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
It introduces rules on transactions with related parties 
2003 The Vietti Reform or 
The Corporate Law 
Reform 
The Government – the 
Parliament 
It introduces, among the other, the possibility for 
companies to adopt not only the traditional corporate 
governance model but also dualistic and monistic 
models in line with the European practice. 
2005 The Savings Law. Law 
no 262/2005 
The Parliament It improves the role and capabilities of Supervisory 
Authorities; transparency; consumer protection. It 
enhances the minority shareholders’ rights, by 
introducing the compulsory mechanism called the slate 
voting (‘voto di lista’) where at least 1/5 of the members 
shall be elected from a slate presented by one or more 
minority stakeholders. 
2006 Update of the Preda Code 
- now Corporate 
Governance Code 
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
 
It provides substantial changes on corporate governance. 
Particularly, every article is divided into three sections: 
principles, criteria and comments. Additionally, other 
changes on shareholders and annual general meetings 
and transparent disclosures have been made on the light 
of the recent Corporate Law Reform (2003) and Savings 
Law (2005)  
2010-
2011 
Update of Corporate 
Governance Code 
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
 
It is now aligned with the EU recommendation (No. (n. 
2009/385) on directors’ remuneration. In particular, it 
distinguishes between executives and non-executives’ 
remuneration; stock options, golden parachute and 
indemnity in event of dismissal or resignation from 
office The role of board is strengthened and the roles of 
the different internal committees (nomination, 
remuneration and audit) are better clarified.  
2014 Update of Corporate 
Governance Code 
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
 
It aligns to the EU recommendation (no. 2014/208) on 
the ‘comply or explain’ approach and to the CONSOB 
recommendations on withdrawal and liquidation value 
of listed joint stock companies’ shares. 
2015 Update of Corporate 
Governance Code 
Committee for the Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies, Italian Stock 
Exchange 
It includes provisions on corporate social responsibility 
and whistleblowing (by strengthening the internal 
control and risk management systems).  
                                                 
10 CONSOB is the public authority responsible for regulating the Italian securities market. 
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2015 ISA Italia 260 
(International Standard 
on Auditing) 
International Federation of 
Accountants in collaboration 
with the Italian Chartered 
Accountants Institute, the 
Italian Internal Auditors 
Institute and CONSOB. 
It requires listed companies to submit to the audit 
committee an annual report on the significant findings 
from the audit, particularly on material weaknesses in 
internal control in relation to the financial reporting 
process. It also requires the listed companies to provide 
annually of the auditor’s independence to the audit 
committee. 
 
  
51 
 
 
Table 5 Variables Definition and Source 
Variable Definition Source 
ROA 
Operating income before depreciation 
divided by fiscal year-end total assets 
Datastream 
Board size 
Sum of independent, executive and non-
executive directors 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database/ 
Independent directors 
The percentage of Independent directors on 
the board 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
CEO/CM duality 
Dummy variable. 1 = CEO/CM duality; 0 = 
CEO/CM non-duality 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
Firm size Natural log of total asset Datastream 
Pretax income 
Company's revenues minus all operating 
expenses, including interest and 
depreciation, before income taxes 
Datastream 
Debt It is the sum of long and short term debt. Datastream 
Market to book value 
Market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity 
Datastream 
Minority Directors 
The number of directors appointed by the 
minority shareholders 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
Firm Age 
The numbers of years since the foundation 
of the company 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
Pre crisis 
Dummy variable. 1 = before 2008; 0 = after 
2008 
Authors’ calculation 
Ownership Composition 
Institutional Investors, Board ownership, 
Management, Government, Own shares, 
Bank 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
CEO_shareholer_dummy 
A binary variable that takes a value of one 
if the CEO is also a shareholder, otherwise 
zero 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
Shareholder Agreements 
Percentage of shareholder agreements over 
the total firms’ property 
Hand collection from companies’ corporate 
governance reports/ CONSOB database 
Ownership 
Concentration 
The percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder of the company 
Authors’ calculation 
Industry Dummy Companies’ industries Authors’ calculation 
Year Dummy Year of analysis Authors’ calculation 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
 
Variables Mean Std dev Variables 
tested in the 
regressions 
Ln 
ROA 
Board Size % 
Independe
nt 
Directors 
CEO 
duality 
% 
Minority 
Directors 
Ownership 
Concentrat
ion 
Firm Size Firm Age Total 
Debt/Total 
Asset 
Market 
value to 
Book 
ROA 0.03 0.09 Ln ROA 1          
Board Size 9.02 2.49 Board Size 0.15 1         
Independent 
Directors 
3.28 1.42 % 
Independent 
Directors 
0.16 0.60 1        
CEO duality 0.47  0.5 CEO duality -0.00 -0.33 -0.31 1       
Number of 
Minority 
Directors  
0.23 0.57 % Minority 
Directors  
0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.08 1      
Ownership 
Concentration 
51.47 14.62 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 1     
Firm Size 12.45 1.07 Firm Size 0.08 0.37 0.07 -0.23 0.09 0.02 1    
Firm Age 26.14 15.99 Firm Age 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.30 1   
Total Debt/Total 
Asset 
0.11 0.10 Total 
Debt/Total 
Asset 
-0.14 0.14 0.19 -0.05 -0.24 0.17 0.16 0.13 1  
Market value to 
Book 
1.78 1.49 Market value 
to Book 
0.18 0.02 0.07 -0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 1 
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Table 7 Results – ROA 
SPECIFICATION (1)  (2)  (3)11 (4)  (5)12  (6) 
Firm Performance (n-1) -.01607 (0.1193228) -0.1050098 
(0.18237) 
0.0051496 
(0.1717228) 
-0.1411585 
(0.1524197) 
0.0120786 
(0.1551123) 
-(0.0415583 
0.1886145) 
Firm Performance (n-2) -.1086387 
(0.0703233) 
-0.0962165 
(0.075988) 
-.0956285 
(0.0792399) 
-0.1260516 
(0.0739482) 
-0.1351289 
(0.0607511)** 
-0.0415583 
(0.1886145) 
Ln Board size 3.9097 
(1.782917)*** 
 27.13073 
(10.45227)*** 
2.829737 
(1.501662)**  
4.19646 
(1.821449)** 
 
Ln Board size Square -0.0193418 
(0.0080746)*** 
 -5.946351 
(2.379324)** 
   
Ln Board size X Precrisis -.1837703 
(0.473105) 
 -.6151641 
(0.8786975) 
-0.9524983 
(3.295189) 
  
Independent Directors  0.7719282 
(0.3808044)** 
17.41513 
(9.52874)* 
2.524542 
(1.024469)** 
 0.4613478 
(0.1845606)*** 
Independent Directors Square  -0.0592602 
(0.0322)** 
-3.815486 
(2.15411)* 
   
Independent Directors X Precrisis  -0.1670275 
(0.0820328) 
-.2671626 
(0.8060701) 
-1.244972 
(2.111927) 
 -.2073972   .591293
7 
Ln Board size X Independent 
Directors 
   -0.9596062 
(0.3819124)*** 
  
Board Size Dummy_7      3.043671 
(1.697062)** 
Board Size Dummy_7 x 
Independent Directors 
     -0.4509612 
(0.18288)** 
       
CeoDualityDummy  
 
    0.393199 
(0.5382032) 
 
CeoDualityDummy X Precrisis     -0.1945666 
(0.5579649) 
 
ExecutiveDualityDummy     0.4679921 
(0.4102953) 
 
Nofdirectorsfromtheminority 
 
-.1392218 
(0.8709821) 
-0.1540367 
(0.1732819) 
-0.0009733 
(0.1816084) 
-0.2633479 
(0.2446985) 
0.1208805 
(0.2254194) 
0.1756375 
(0.2279296) 
totBoard_Roles 
 
-0.0020557* 
(0.0059638) 
-.0116145* 
(0.0076441) 
-0.0036276* 
(0.0057696) 
-0.0059731* 
(0.0126863) 
-0.0022102* 
(0.0071454) 
-0.0007687* 
(0.0053219) 
                                                 
11 As independent directors are part of the board of directors, we moderate the ‘independent directors’ variable with ‘the board size minus independent directors’ 
12 To validate our results, we also run other regressions where apart from ‘CEO duality dummy’, ‘Independent directors’ was an additional independent variable. The results 
remained unchanged. We also tested if the results change whether an executive director (other than a CEO) acts as a Chairman. We confirm that our results do not change. 
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OwnershipConcen  
 
0.0108519 
(0.0240295) 
0.0109884 
(0.0178817) 
0.0072185 
(0.0206225) 
0.0159633 
(0.0183714) 
0.0055859 
(0.0189748) 
0.005174 
(0.0214331) 
Firm Size 
 
9.4208 
(4.4607) 
-3.5607  
(3.1517) 
-3.3708  
(3.4707) 
-2.3108 
(6.0807) 
-1.3507  
4.6607) 
1.2206 
(1.5706) 
Firm Age 
 
-0.0249731 
(0.0280177) 
-0.0630786 
(0.0294103)* 
-0.0072836 
(0.0349479) 
-0.0661081 
(0.029042)* 
-0.0322096 
(0.0268913) 
-0.8813485 
(0.5502741) 
Debt/Total asset -.4452699 
(0.2089969)** 
-0.1354625 
(0.1410807) 
-0.3522775 
(0.2682131) 
-0.0542359 
(0.1763937) 
-0.4646542 
(0.2265709)** 
-0.3113145 
(0.2748784) 
Mrktvaluetobook 
 
0.0746367 
(0.1591701)  
0.64501 
(1.55942) 
-5.0707 
(4.6407) 
0.3212916 
(1.6251) 
0582631 
(0.0620492) 
0.152579 
(0.0839277)* 
Pretax Income 0.0081 
(0.11116) 
0.0000138 
(7.3106)* 
6.2306 
(3.2206)* 
0.0000106 
(5.3906) 
0.0000107 
(3.7006)* 
3.9406 
(4.7206) 
Precrisis 0.5440332 
(1.042869) 
0.5216106 
(0.2792668)* 
1.79384 
(1.180139) 
2.9032 
(7.438385) 
0.5534479 
(1.206321) 
-0.0716416 
(0.1911915) 
       
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences:  
z =  -0.64  Pr > z =  
0.522 
z =  -1.19  Pr > z =  
0.232 
z =  -0.88  Pr > z =  
0.380 
z =  -1.24  Pr > z =  
0.214 
z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  
0.340 
z =  -0.39  Pr > z =  
0.696 
Sargan test  
 
chi2(81)   =  67.66  
Prob > chi2 =  0.855 
 
chi2(66)   =  40.08  
Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
chi2(51)   =  39.61  
Prob > chi2 =  0.877 
chi2(47)   =  31.49  
Prob > chi2 =  0.960 
chi2(70)   =  61.26  
Prob > chi2 =  0.763 
chi2(43)   =  32.31  
Prob > chi2 =  0.883 
Hansen test 
 
chi2(81)   =  50.65  
Prob > chi2 =  0.997 
chi2(66)   =  40.18  
Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
chi2(51)   =  41.21  
Prob > chi2 =  0.834 
chi2(47)   =  40.71  
Prob > chi2 =  0.729 
chi2(70)   =  48.64  
Prob > chi2 =  0.976 
chi2(43)   =  40.48  
Prob > chi2 =  0.581 
Robust Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*)
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Table 8 Results – ROA 
SPECIFICATION (7) (8) (9)13 (10) (11)14 (12) 
Firm Performance (n-1) -0.0301376 
(0.194025) 
-0.1867143 
(0.2322545) 
-0.0445312 
(0.1244416) 
-0.092996 
(0.20814) 
-
0.0857698 
(0.150171
5) 
0.0214374 
(0.155115) 
Firm Performance (n-2) -0.1355133 
(0.0873335) 
-0.1497559 
(0.1236723) 
-0.1278727 
(0.1009106) 
-0.130842 
(0.0867758
) 
-
0.1115762 
(0.099131
9) 
-0.1329054 
(0.1166331) 
Ln Board size 3.572404   
(1.724217)*
* 
 16.96988 
(9.285854)* 
2.81923 
(1.673141)
* 
  
Ln Board size Square -.0196698 
(0.0083322)
** 
 -4.294744 
(2.155327)* 
   
Ln Board size X Precrisis -.1345328 
(0.6889805) 
 1.245163 
(1.266716) 
1.246532 
(2.744172) 
  
Independent Directors  2.002898  
(0.9686215)
** 
1.8672 
(0.9841582)
** 
2.234491 
(1.231841)
** 
 0.6949402 
(0.3119171)
** 
Independent Directors 
Square 
 -.2157448 
(0.1124796)
* 
-.0175605 
(0.020933)* 
   
Independent Directors X 
Precrisis 
 0.0143483 
(0.1664235) 
-1.107353 
(1.211925) 
0.0120824 
(1.659644) 
 0.3169844 
(1.111121) 
Ln Board size X 
Independent Directors 
   -0.8552983 
(0.4350785
)* 
  
Board Size Dummy_7      3.301081 
(1.999605)* 
Board Size Dummy_7 x 
Independent Directors 
     -.6942081 
(0.3127884)
* 
       
CeoDualityDummy  
 
    -
0.0347312 
(0.321776
6) 
 
CeoDualityDummy X 
Precrisis 
    0.3438253 
(0.534360
8) 
 
ExecutiveDualityDummy     0.1519822 
(0.416792
) 
 
Nofdirectorsfromthemino
rity 
 
-0.8703359 
(1.286095) 
-0.2161647 
(0.3068097) 
0.1901996 
(0.8655774) 
-0.2187942 
(0.3936274
) 
-
0.1506238 
(0.399166
5) 
-0.1213981 
(0.2984759) 
totBoard_Roles 
 
0.004374 
(0.007057) 
0.0033663 
(0.0124272) 
0.0167218 
(0.0119817) 
0.0005261 
(0.0104105
) 
-
0.0134624 
(0.014800
3) 
0.0009093 
(0.0066116) 
                                                 
13 As independent directors are part of the board of directors, we moderate the ‘independent directors’ variable with ‘the 
board size minus independent directors’ 
14 To validate our results, we also run other regressions where apart from ‘CEO duality dummy’, ‘Independent 
directors’ was an additional independent variable. The results remained unchanged. We also tested if the results change 
whether an executive director (other than a CEO) acts as a Chairman. We confirm that our results do not change 
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Firm Size 
 
-1.3807 
(6.1207) 
1.9708 
(1.6206) 
5.2108 
(1.1506) 
-5.2707 
(8.0807) 
5.7807 
(7.3307) 
-6.2307 
(1.6706) 
Firm Age 
 
0.0035623 
(0.0458066) 
-0.0079549 
(0.0646467) 
-0.046446 
(0.0613351) 
-0.0397938 
(0.0334547
) 
-
0.0292396 
(0.033984
9) 
-0.0269289 
(0.7636791) 
Debt/Total asset -0.4161632 
(0.2632791) 
0.0414144 
(0.3734673) 
0.058637 
(0.2294721) 
-0.2929735 
(0.366169) 
-
0.2815191 
(0.190376
3) 
-0.1679431 
(0.2367262) 
Mrktvaluetobook 
 
0.0005929 
(0.0003164)
* 
-0.018459 
(0.198030) 
1.1507 
(6.4807) 
0.0183003 
0.0670669 
0.016645 
(0.062895
9) 
0.0184064 
(0.1043745) 
Pretax Income 0.000011 
(0.0000128) 
4.7806 
(6.0906) 
0.0000148 
(6.8106)* 
7.3706 
(6.3106) 
0.8106 
(4.5406)* 
5.7606 
(2.3906) 
Precrisis 0.4954817 
(1.5258) 
-0.0666788 
(0.659233) 
-1.578461 
(2.176168) 
-2.036364 
(5.313169) 
-
0.1266884 
(0.283944
8) 
0.0900385 
(0.2393535) 
NationalInstitSIC  0.0700717 
(0.0471207) 
0.0290798 
(0.0410274) 
0.0145254 
(0.0378687) 
0.0195339 
(0.03625) 
-
0.0044268 
(0.031074
7) 
0.0168117 
(0.0322703) 
Board ownership  -0.4080161 
(0.4795034) 
0.3628237 
(0.6153434) 
-0.2036537 
(0.3783377) 
-0.161082 
(0.3203551
) 
-
0.0221198 
(0.320741
) 
-0.0238353 
(0.5242992) 
Management -0.2695966 
(0.4904016) 
-0.208428 
(1.276554) 
-0.0482317 
(0.139834) 
-0.0329484 
(0.4738833
) 
-
0.2138566 
(0.416479
7) 
0.383423 
(0.8187439) 
Government 0.1627905 
(0.5578397) 
-.2097303 
(0.5421578) 
-1.117262 
(0.6374076) 
0.3185523 
(0.7847626
) 
-
0.5363476 
(0.982075
6) 
-0.1953897 
(0.7482084) 
Own shares  -0.0270338 
(0.0468216) 
-.0608917 
(0.0985488) 
0.0349344 
(0.0843273) 
-0.0933413 
(0.0916564
) 
-
0.0322801 
(0.070131
4) 
-0.0209437 
(0.0800984) 
Bank 0.0132498 
(0.0259759) 
0363809 
(0.0755319) 
0.001306 
(0.0232477) 
-0.0104784 
(0.0230708
) 
-
0.0143376 
(0.017507
9) 
-0.0107848 
(0.0260919) 
CEO_Shareholder_Dum
my 
1.026274 
(1.040444) 
-1.230251 
(1.710311) 
1.275862 
(1.943851) 
-0.3294365 
(1.284339) 
-
0.0047646 
(0.010011
4) 
-0.7597851 
(2.381604) 
% shareholder agreement 0.0002188 
(.0060121) 
-.0157949 
(0.0153933) 
-0.0060388 
(0.0102518) 
-0.0037324 
(0.0106854
) 
0.1939985 
(1.053172
) 
-0.0062136 
(0.0106117) 
       
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences:  
z =  -0.48  Pr 
> z =  0.631 
z =  -0.84  Pr 
> z =  0.400 
z =  -0.46  Pr 
> z =  0.643 
z =  -1.10  
Pr > z =  
0.272 
z =  -0.99  
Pr > z =  
0.321 
z =  -0.44  Pr 
> z =  0.659 
Sargan test  
 
chi2(54)   =  
43.53  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.845 
chi2(28)   =  
22.64  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.751 
chi2(89)   =  
56.42  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.997 
chi2(50)   =  
35.95  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.933 
 
chi2(70)   
=  52.66  
Prob > 
chi2 =  
0.939 
chi2(55)   =  
41.29  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.915 
57 
 
Hansen test 
 
chi2(54)   =  
39.29  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.934 
chi2(28)   =  
23.93  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.685 
chi2(89)   =  
31.76  Prob 
> chi2 =  
1.000 
 
chi2(50)   =  
33.56  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.964 
chi2(70)   
=  45.86  
Prob > 
chi2 =  
0.989 
chi2(55)   =  
37.81  Prob 
> chi2 =  
0.963 
Robust Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*) 
 
 
